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LABOUR MIGRllTION FROM THE DELAGOA BAY 
HINTERLAND TO SOUTH AFRICA: 1852-1895* 
Patrick Harries 
Sir Percy Fitspatrick, while giving evidence before the Transvaal Labour 
Commission, commented that "the Portuguese East Coast has been the salvation of the 
Rand". (1) With African labour costs estimated at just over 25% of total average 
costs, and as much as 600h to 700h in the more labour intensive mines of the eastern 
Transvaal, the profitability of the South African goldmines was believed to be 
dependent on cheap, regular sources of labour. (2) 
This paper seeks to outline the origins and growth of migrating labour from 
the Delagoa Bay hinterland to the labour m k e t s  of South Africa in the period before 
the Portuguese conquest. It examines the causes of labour migmtion in terms of a 
social and economic adjustment to new pressures operating on and from within Tsonga 
society. 
fPhe origins of migratory labour movements from the Delagoa B a ~ r  hinterland (3) 
to the labour markets of South Africa can be traced back to the suggestions in the 
1852-3 Natal Native Affairs Commission which related to the importation of Tsonga (4) 
r 
labour. 
In the 1850s numerous Tsonga accompanied Zulu "refugeesff into Natal, and 
there is evidence of Tsonga families being indentured for three-year periods. (5) 
According to Mpfmo tradition, in 1858 a number of Zulu ivory hunter-recruiters 
appeared in the vicinity of the Bay and several men went to Pietermaritzburg where 
they earned wages of 5s-7s per month. (6) In the same year a memorial was placed 
before the Lt.-General of Natal calling for the withdrawal of restrictions limiting 
the free flow of Tsonga migrants into Natal and for the state to intercede with the 
"Zulu authorities" in order to facilitate the flow of Tsonga labour thm* their 
ternitpry. It was considered that "the amdTonga tribe from their natural disposition 
and habits are a people well suited" to sugar cultivation. (7) To this end a 
commission was appointed, and law 13 of 1859 attempted to centralize and regulate the 
flow of Tsonga migrants into Natal. 
In the 1860s the Tsonga question was largely overshadowed by the importation 
of indentured Indian labour. However, the continued harassment of Tsongd passing 
*This paper was prepared at an early stage of research, and is presented here in a 
slightly modified form. 
t h r o w  Zululand limited the number of migrants entering Natal and elicited appeals 
for government intervention. (8) This the government refused to do, ostensibly in 
order not to become embroiled in Zulu politics. (9) 
This attitude changed radically with the approaching completion of Indian 
indentures in 1872 and the fluid political situation in southern Mozambique. 
In southern Mozambique, the Ngoni king, Mawewe, had been deposed by his 
brother,Umzila, during the civil war of 1858-1862. Fleeing with three Ngoni 
regiments, Mkzrsewe settled on the northern border of his Swazi allies and sent 
expeditionary forces deep into the Gaza marches of Khosen and Bilene. Owing to the 
threat posed by Mawewe, and seeking to benefit from more lucrative ivory areas, 
Umzila moved his capital north of the Save River, 15 *S' march from the Limpopo. 
The Ihputo, securing their western flank through a marriage alliance with 
the Swazi, attempted to fill the power vacuum south of the Nkomati by defeating 
Umzilals allies in the Delagoa Bay hinterland on several occasions in the late 1860s 
and early 1870s. 
The overland labour route was effectively blockaded or, alternatively, made 
unsafe to the peoples living north of Maputo by the endemic warfare constantly flaring 
up between the different "Tsongafl polities of the area, by Naputo expansion and by the 
instability of the post-civil w a r  period. In 1868 Umzila offered to facilitate the 
importation of Gaza labour into Natal if the British would neutralize the Swazi-lvlawewe 
impediment to the southward flow of Ngoni migrants. With the prospect of tapping what 
the Lt.-Governor of Natal considered "the large mass of unemployed labour at present 
sealed up in the territory [of Gazalfl, a diplomatic mission was sent to Umzila under 
the command of St Vincent Erskine, the son of the Natal colonial secretary. Although 
the mission failed to produce any cogent results, further correspondence was entered I 
into (ll), and in 1872 the first migrants from Bilene were noticed in Natal. (12) 
While most of those migrants, blocked for political reasons from passing through the 
Delagoa Bay area, were obliged to travel throu& the Transvaal to Natal, the sea route 
from Delagoa Bay was, according to Keate in 1870, "beginning to grow into some 
importanceIt. The following year the Portuguese clamped down on this "clandestineft 
recruitment and proceeded to levy a 15s passport fee per contracted migrant shipped 
from Delag~a Bay. (13) 
There is much evidence to suggest that the attempted annexation of southern 
Del,agog Bay and X y w  Island to Natal in the early 1870s was largely motivated by a 
desire to secure a safe station for shipping migrant labour from north of Maputo and 
Zululand to Durban and thence to the Natal sugar plantations and Kimberley. (14) I 
However, after the MacMahon award of 1875 went in favour of the Portuguese, a treaty 
was; signed,between the governors of Mozambique and Natal which marked the beginning 
of a regulated trade in contract labour from Mozambique to South Africa. By 
monopolizing the sea route, the Natal government envisaged that labour contracted at 
Delagoa Bay would cost 50% to 7009 less than indentured Indian labour and would undercut 
the existing w p  rate in Natal by 1ph to 379. The treaty drew accusations of neo- 
slavery as contracts were not dated and there were no stipulations as to the hours of 
work or fixing of salary. Much of the labour came from press-ganged slaves repatriated 
at Lourengo Marques by the British anti-slavery squadron operating in the Mozambique 
Channel. Much of the expense involved in this "Voluntary migration Scheme" went into 
ftguarding and superintendingtt prospective migrants at the Lourengo Marques depat and 
in preventing their " m n g  awayrt. Contracts were officially for 2-3 years, and a 
passport fee of 11s per migrant was paid by the recruits. 
Maputoland, because of its geopolitical position, supplied most of the 
Mozambicavl labour working in Natal. "Large numbers were constavltly passing through 
Zululand singly and in pairs." Zulu vassals until 1879, the Maputo were allowed to 
pass through Zululand, althow this did not stop the Zulus from conniderlng them 
'lobjects of legitimate plunderff. (16) In order to create a free flow of labour, 
Shepstone concluded an agreement with Cetshwo in 1873 whereby "no obstacle to 
reaching Natal through Zululand would be placed in the way of tribes beyond ... and 
that op their return to their own country these labourers would be protected from 
being robbed of the wages they had thus earnedf1. (17) To this end, John Dunn was 
appointed amaTonga agent at an annual salary of £300 and shelters were built along 
the coastal route. 
The 1859 law had failed to place Tsonga migrants under government control, 
d in 1871 a new law was promulgated whereby Tsonga migrants were to register with 
magistrates on entering Natal. Applicants for labour were then to pay a 10s 
"recrui-tment fee" to the magistrate. Neither the 1859 nor the 1871 laws had much 
success. In 1877, despite the raising of Voluntary bigration labour wages to a par 
with existing wage rates in Natal, Shepstone complained that, of the 1,345 Tsonga 
contracted,to work on the Natal railways, 1,232 had been recruited by hunterrecruiters 
working either directly in Maputo or on the coastal route. (18) Thus the Tsonga 
migrants effectively rejected centralized recruiting in favour of the open labour 
market. 
By 1879 the Tsonga were considered the "most regular labour supply of Natal", 
averaging periods of up to 2 to 3 years in the colony. (19) The "reliabilityf1 of 
Tsonga labour was determined by the length and harshness of the route and the 
restrictions placed on summer travel; in the wet summer season swollen streams had to 
be crossed arnd the potential migrant preferred to work on his fields. Altho@ 
considered the best route through Zululand, the coastal route was plagued by malaria 
and black water fever and was considered dangerous during the wet summer months. (20) 
Thus the migrants were obliged to travel in winter, and this necessitated a minimum 
residence of six months in Natal. Of the 11,442 Tsonga mig~ants entering and leaving 
through the southern Tugela magistracy in 1881 and 1882, over 70°/0 travelled in the 
winter months. (21) As yet, it is difficult to determine what effect the opening up 
of new labour markets in South Africa had on potential Tsonga labour supplies. The 
Natal planters felt that sources of Tsong'a labour were drying up by the late 1880s, 
which mi&t indicate that it was being diverted to other markets within South 
Africa. (22) 
The Maputo continued to make up the majority of migrants travelling to Natal 
as, for those living north of Maputo, the use of the sea route meant contracting to 
unknown employers for long periods at uncompetitive wages and was not without &angers; 
under the illusion of being shipped to Natal, migrants were habitually sent to 
Madagascar as indentured labour. (23) In the early 1890s, in order to stimulate the 
sea mute and discourage what the Portuguese considered overland "~landestine~~ labour, 
shipping capacity limits were raised from two migrants to four per ton and the 
stipulation that a doctor should accompany each boatload was abolished. (24) Labour 
movements between Mozambique and Natal continued into the beginning of the twentieth 
century. (25) 
1870 is known as the year of diltl_nan amongst the Nkuna Tsonga, and is 
considered by the Tsonga to be synonymous with mines. As guns were freely available 
in the Delagoa Bay area, most of the Mozambican labour attracted to Kimberley came 
from Gaza. (26) However, m q  Tsonga from the Delagoa Bm hinterland were attracted 
by the high, althovgh fluctuating, monthly wages of £3 to £5 on the diamond fields of 
Griqualand West. Diamond thefts also provided an incentive, and Delagoa Bay became 
known as a place "where a vast number of stolen diamonds are planted about the 
different kraalsl1. (27) In 1884, about 1,120 "Shangaan" and 735 "Portuguese Zulus" 
were working on the Kimberley fields. (28) 
There is evidence of Tsonga labour being officially shipped from Lourengo 
Masques to Cape Town as early as 1875 (29), but it was only after the 1879 Cape Select 
Committee on Labour, which noted the successes of Natal and recommended the importation 
of Tsonga field and railway labour, that Tsonga labowc was systematically recruited. 
At this stage of research it is difficult to quantify the amount of labour leaving 
Delagoa Bay for South Africa, but one Cape recruiter, using Natal recruiting links and 
the ltaidfl of Portuguese officials, claimed to have imported 3,000 Tsonga as farm labour 
on three-year contracts at 15s to 25s per month. (30) Another 1,000 were imported by 
the railways and harbours in 1881-2 under the aided immigration scheme. Tsonga 
labour proved satisfactory to the farmers, although there were desertions by men 
returning in "large bodies" to Mozambique, possibly via Kimberley. Shipping 
continued on a much reduced scale into the 1890s, and in 1895 1,858 Mozambicans were 
estimated to be domiciled in the Cape Colony. (31) 
There was a rapid response in the Delagoa Bay area to the labour demands of 
the Transvaal alluvial goldfields in the early 1870s. Owing to low wages of 20s to 
25s per month, labour tended to be seasonal and "large gangs brought from Delagoa 
Bay" were important in ending labour shortages during the planting season. (32) 
Porterage to the goldfields in the winter added another source of income; 10s per 
501bs to Lydenburg and 15s to PilgrimtsRest. There was also a demand for labour on 
the farms supplying the goldfields with agricultural produce; farmers "generally had 
no difficulty" in securing labour at 20s per month. (33) 
A new demand for labour arose, both in numbers and skills, with the opening 
of the reef mines at Barberton in 1884. The eastern Transvaal mines were dependent on 
Tsonga migrants, who constituted the majority of the work force; but, with the opening 
up of the Rand mines, the mines of the &stern Transvaal became "half-way houses" for 
Tsonga migrants attracted by the higher wages offered on the Rand (63s in October 1890). 
In the early 1890s the more labour intensive and less profitable Barberton mines could 
only afford to pay wages of 33s per month, Pilgrim's Rest 27s, and the smaller 
Swaziland diggings 20s. (34) The wages earned on these mines provided the capital 
needed for the long and expensive journey to the Rand. Another source of competition 
for labour came from the NZASM,constructing the railway from Komanti Poort to Pretoria. 
The NZASM placed several contracts with recruiters for 3,000 Tsonga. (35) It is 
difficult at this stage of research to estimate what percentage of Mozambican labour 
on the Rand came from the Delagoa Ba;?i hinterland. Whereas, before 1885 the Inhambane 
hinterland had been concerned with supplying the French Islands of the Indian Ocean with 
indentured labour, the Delagoa Bay hinterland had a long tradition of labour mig'rancy 
to South Africa and consequently it constituted the easiest area of labour recruitment 
south of the Save River. Proximity to the goldfields also favoured Delagoa Bay, 
Suffice it to say that in 1887, in the Maputo area alone, more than half the 
able-bodied male population was estimated to be working at any given period in the 
Transvaal, Natal or Kimberley. (36) By 1904 it was considered that the labour 
potential of the Delagoa Bay hinterland had been exhausted. (37) 
In 1890 there were about 8,750 Mozambicans working on the Rand. (38) When 
the newly consolidated Chamber of Mines reduced wages from 63s to 44s in 1890, the 
Mozanbican response was to withhold labour, and the following year the Mozambican 
labour force dropped to 7,000. (39) When the 1890 wage determinations were abandoned 
and wages rose, Mozambican workers returned to the Rand and, according to one source, 
by 1893 they totalled between 19,500 and 22,100. (40) 
In the same year (1893) the Chamber of Mines created a Native Labour 
Department, with a mandate "to systematically organize the native labour supplytt and 
to "tackle the native problem, and endeavour, while lowering the rate of native wages, 
to secure an ample supply of labour". (41) The NLD was undercapitalized from the 
start. Members paid 3d per African worker and 6d from 1895, but it was estimated that 
Mozanbican labour cost from £4 to £5.10~ to bring one migrant to the Rand. As 
desertions were high, individual mines could lose up to 75% of labour premiums; in 
1895, six companies lost £7,317 from desertions. (42) It was more profitable to 
recyit migrants on the Rand, either new arrivals or men drawn away from other mines 
by offers of higher wages. 
Recruiters built shelters and provided food along the already established 
labour routes into the Transvaal. Runners were sent out from the mair, camp, and after 
sufficient numbers had been collected they were despatched under an induna to the Rand 
and there disposed of the the highest bidder. Many Mozambicans travelled individually 
so as to sell their labour to the highest bidder. To travel without the aid of a 
recruiting agent entailed @eat hardships. As one recruiter, angling for a Chamber 
of Mines contract, stated: "the skeletons of those who have died are frequently seen, 
and at almost every store and dwelling near the road can be found those whom sickness 
and fatigue have compelled to give up the road." (43) 
The Kruger government procrastinated over the passing of a new Pass law 
which would, theoretically, restrict desertions, and the Volksraad blocked the 
building of rest stations along the eastern routes as they feared it would give the 
Chamber of Mines a monopoly of labour. Native comissioners earned an unofficial 
capitation fee of 10s to £l per migrant, and many Veldkornets were in the p w  of 
farmers and recruiters. Migrants would be arrested for not carrying travel passes 
and would be released only when the farmer or recruiter paid the Is travel pass fee. 
In 1891 the Chamber complained that Itit is impossible for East Coast Kaffirs to get 
through to Johannesburg unless they contrive to break thro@ without being detected 
by the police. (44) Robberies and press-gangings were frequent, and forced most 
migrants to travel awaj. from the main routes in small groups at night; by so doing 
the migrants risked being made subject to forced labour for trespass. As the Volksraad 
opposed the importation of Cape labour, the Chamber of Mines were dependent on 
Volksraad-controlled labour sources within the ZAR: perhaps a deliberate strategy on 
the part of the Volksraad. These actions by the Kmger government led the mines to l l 
create private police forces and establish their own "veldllcornets" along the labour 
mutes. 
Before the completion of the LM-Rand railway in 1894, the Chamber was 
prevented from lowering wages by environmental limitations on mid-winter travel on the 
cold Highveld and by the nature of the agricultural cycle. Owing to the severe labour 
shortages in winter it was feared that a reduction in wages would halt winter work on 
the mines. In this respect, "Shangaan" mig~ants were highly valued as they spent 
long periods on the had. This can be gauged from the relatively large pay packets 
C taken home by returning Mozambican migrants - roughly £26 .l0 in 1895. (45) Because 
of the long periods spent on the mines, Mozambicans were able to acqvire specialized 
skills and they came to dominate undergmund work. (46) 
Probably the greatest obstacle to an NI;D recruiting monopsony was the 
absence of any dominant political authority in the Del-a B w  hinterland with which 
they could deal. 
I 
Following the dea-bh of Mawewe in 1873, hostilities between the Swazi and the 
Ngoni ceased. Maputo, threatened in the south by an expanding Swazi group and by the 
secession of vassal areas which had previously provided lebensraum for excess Maputo 
population, was defeated in 1876 by the combined amies of Mpfumo and Nondwane allied 
to the Portuguese. Following the defeat of Zululand in 1879, and with Umzila living 
north of the Save, the Portuguese were partially able to fill the political vacuum and 
military customs posts were placed on the Nkomati and Tembe rivers. In 1888 a 
magistracy was founded 10 miles north of Louren~o Marques, and the following year a 
decree was issued prohibiting "clandestine1' recruitment. When Umzilals son, Gungunyana, 
returned to Bilene in 1889-90 with 60,000 followers, the Portuguese, attempting to add 
substance to their claims to the area south of the Nkomati, placed military posts on 
the labour routes passing through Nwambo, Khosen and Bilene - althow the last was 
withdrawn when G- threatened to go to war with the Portuguese because of their 
encroachment on the Gaza state and their attempt to levy "passport fees" on Gaza 
migrant workers going to South Africa. 
Although the Portuguese made armed tax raids beyond the Lourengo Marques area, 
it was estimated that in 1892 they were only able to tax a twenty mile area, surrounding 
the town. In this area an annual hut tax of 1/6d to 4s, payable in kind, was levied. 
Migmats passing along the labour routes were assembled at Portuguese military posts and 
handed over to lkccredited" labour agents, who paid their 15s passport fee, a contract 
fee, and various vsundries" which generally totalled a further 15s to 25s. (47) Most 
migrants avoided the military posts as they did not wish to sign contracts or become 
registered for taxes (48), nor did recruiters wish to increase their overheads. When 
the Portuguese supply camps were used, recruiters made a habit of taking out one 
passport and using it several times. 
The Portuguese attempt in 1895 to monopolize labour exportation by 
prohibiting foreign labour recruiters and by giving a recruiting concession to a local 
resident - possibly because the ZAR was harbouring refugees from the Portuguese-Roue 
War, but more probably because of the support given by certain free-lance recruiters 
to the Gaza cause - had little effect until after the defeat of Gungunya.na. In marked 
contrast, when G u n g w n y w  recalled his men for military service in the war of 1895, 
more than 150 Mozambicans left the Rand esch clay. With Gaza impis patrolling the 
border, the flow of Mozambican labour to the Rand stopped completely in September 
1895, causing a sldisastrous labour shortage", especially of underground workers. (49) 
Labour migration was actively encouraged by many of the leaders of the 
various polities of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. In 1871 an English hunter-trader- 
recruiter paid the Maputo chief, Nozingili, a "contracting fee" in guns and liquor 
for an unspecified number of migrants and reported that Cetshwayo had sent 300 to 400 
Tsonga vassals to Natal and personally had earned £600 to £800 by so doing. (50) 
This policy was continued after 1879 by Zibhebhu. Both Zambili (1877-1891) and 
Ngwanazi (1891-1895) of Maputo levied a £1 tax on all retwrning migrants, Ngwanazi 
demanding a £5-£10 indemnity of all migrants leaving before completing their military 
service. (51) Migrants from Bilene and Khosen paid Umzila an unspecified tax in 
coins. (52) Recruiters working in Mozambique claimed that they paid a recruiting fee 
of £1 per mig'rant or gave unspecified "presents" to the chiefs. (53) By 1896 the 
British vice-consul at Lourengo Marques considered the levying of "labour taxes" on 
migTants by the traditional leaders of the Delagoa Bay polities to be a "common 
practice". The export of migrant labour by the rulers of the south and central Tsonga 
must be seen in terms of a change in the mode of subsistence of the area, the under- 
mining of centralized pre-conquest commodity production and exchange, and the formation 
of dependency linkages. 
The soil of the Delagoa Bay hinterland is very sandy and porous and rainfall 
in the wet season is highly unreliable, especially in the south. (54) Water holes are 
scarce and tend to dry up during periods of drought. According to an English 
missionary, 
on account of the poverty and dryness of the soil, which 
in appearance is just like sand, the natives in the least 
drougkt are often in a starving condition, throw failm 
of their crops. The appearance of the soil to an ordinary 
Eumpean would lead him to believe that nothing would 
possibly grow in it. Yet it is very surprising how the 
natives do produce from it ... if they get the rain in its 
season. The uncertainty of the food crops is, of course, 
a great incentive to the natives to offer themselves for 
work, and the rate of wages offered in the labour market 
is a great attraction. (55) 
Patches of black "Inyaka" soil, rich in humus content, are, however, found 
in the Nondwane and other areas, and patches of fertile red soil are situated along the 
coast and in Khosen. But the highest premium was placed on the three minor alluvium- 
depositing rivers, the Maputo, Tembe and Mfoloti, and especially the Nkomati and 
Limpopo rivers which meander through broad alluvial plains. Flood and tidal irrigation 
was practised on the Limpopo and Nkomati, and to a lesser extent on the other three 
rivers. These rivers provided valuable water for human and, where tsetse had been 
driven away by bush clearance, stock consumption. 
The south and central Tsonga were cultivators and cattle keepers who 
supplemented this basic mode of subsistence with hunting, gathering and fishing. 
Although an excellent cattle grazing area with an estimated ability to support one 
beast per 12 acres (56), the 19th century Tsonga lost most of their cattle through 
the incursions of various displaced Nguni groups in the 1 8 2 0 ~ ~  Zulu military 
expeditions in the late 1820s and early 1830s, the Ngoni volkerwanderung and the 
decade of raiding which followed the Ngoni civil war of 1858-1862. But cattle keeping 
was also restricted by the tsetse belt, which extended 30 miles east of the Lebombo 
mountains, and by large fly patches throughout the area. It seems possible that 
tsetse was expanding in the mid-19th century as there is much evidence of deserted 
cattle kraals and it is believed that animal tryyansomiasis spread into Zululand from 
the Tsonga areas. There are a number of possible non-ecological reasons for this: 
political disturbances would have restricted anti-tsetse activities such as bush 
clearance and p s s  burning, and the early Tsongz migrants would have acted as hosts 
to both the infectious sporozoites of the tsetse and to the fly itself. Tsonga cattle 
also suffered from lung sickness a d  redwater fever. There is evidence of a major 
epidemic in the Bilene area, in the late 1860s. 
It is a curious circumstance that most of this country 
once abounded in cattle, and that since the original 
has been destroyed it has been so infested by an 
insidious disease that they are mostly confined to the 
coast and the mountains of the interior. 
This is probably a reference to lungsickness brougkt by cattle imported from Zululand 
in the early 1860s. 
The loss of Tsonga cattle brought about a major social and economic crisis 
in the area. Perhaps influenced by the Venda, amongst whom cattle were scarce and who 
consequently w e d  hoes as a means of brideprice, the Tsonga adopted the same mode of 
brideprice exchange. From 1840 to 1855, 80-100 hoes constituted a brideprice valued 
at from 8 to 10 cattle. But, as traders settled in the interior in order to benefit 
from the wage earning3 of labour migrants, vast numbers of hoes were imported from 
England and Gemany and hoes came to be used as a comon means of exchaYlge. (58) The 
overissue of hoes caused a deflation in value against cattle; this depreciation in the 
value of hoes was more marked around Lourengo Marques, where, by 1870, up to 50 hoes 
were needed to buy one beast. 
As the Tsongd lost confidence in hoes, they were replaced by Ehglish 
sovereigns e m e d  in British South Africa. Junod dates this transformation to 1865- 
1870. From 1870, Mpfumo marriage transactions were concluded with W l i s h  gold 
sovereigns. In 1886 it was reported that the coinage of Lourengo Marques was 
dependent on migrants' earnings. (59) European traders exchanged goods for mipantsf 
sovereigns in Maputo in the early 1870s and in Bilene in the 1880s. (60) In 1879 a 
British official reported of the Maputo that l'English money is their currency, Portuguese 
money not being understood". Eight years later, the Britislz consul was able to remark 
that llBglish money has become the currency of the country . . . when the [~ourengo 
Marques) P D  attempted to pay the Kaffirs employed on the railway works in Portuguese 
silver, they refused in a body to accept it, saying "his is no money' and would not 
work until they had received the British shilling". 
The decline of cattle keeping and the increasing use of labour saving hoes 
meant that labour was released from the local economy and made available to the mining 
and agricultural enterprises of South Africa. Concomitantly, as increasj-ng numbers of 
migrants left the area to earn brideprices valued in Ehglish sovereigns, and as the 
latter became the common wan? of exchamge in the Delagoa Bay area, the amount of . 
English money in circulation spiralled. Inflation set in and the chiefs were unable 
to control lobola prices, which, by the end of the century, had more than doubled. (61) 
Although originally set at £8, during the reign of Maphunga (1870?-1890), Nondwane 
brideprices were fixed at £15.10. (62) In 1887 a Maputo was advised by missionaries 
to work in Natal or the Transvaal for one year in order to earn a brideprice of S20. (63) 
On his accession in 1890, an Mpf'umo chief produced a lobola of £30 and 20 cattle for 
his principal wife and two attendants, sub-chiefs contributing £1, headmen 10s, and 
villages Is each. (64) The need for British currency was accompanied by a desire for 
South African consumer goods unobtainable in the Delagoa Ba~r area. This explains why 
the Tsonga were unwilling to work for Portuguese employers and why the latter, from an 
early date, came to employ forced labour. (66) 
Cattle losses allowed a more concentrated form of agricultural production 
as the pressures to expand winter pastures owing to sweetveld overgrazing in the 
summer tsetse season were removed. Initial evidence points to millet being replaced 
by more productive and less land intensive maize in non-riverine areas, following the 
end of the Mawewe-fiwazi raids. Although maize had long been the staple in the fertile 
riverine areas (67), millet was considered the Tsonga staple (68) ; European hunters 
in the Maputo area in the 1850s were fed on a staple diet of black inyoti millet, and 
the latter formed the basic diet of Tsonga traders in the eastern Transvaal. (69) But 
maize production needs to be concentrated in fertile areas, and during periods of 
insecurity these would have attracted unwelcome raiding parties. Thus, whereas the 
Tsonga today keep maize in granaries, during the Ngoni civil war "stinking maize" had 
to be hidden in "pits in the ground". (70) The spread of maize out of the river 
valleys probably occasioned Junodts belief that maise entered the area only after 
1820. (71) It seems, however, that maize was adopted as a staple only in the 1870s, 
for in the late 1880s millet was grown largely as a ferment for maize beer, altho- 
it remained the principal famine breaker. (72) At the sane time, sor&m was 
gradually replaced by cassava, "tasting highly of prussic acidff. (73) The harvesting 
of sorghum by women in Tsonga society is prohibited, and its replacement by cassava, 
which is less dependent on land and labour factors, indicates a31 adjustment to both 
more concentra$ed agricultural production and settlement and. to male labour losses to 
South Africa. ' 
The adoption of maize as a staple increased the premiums attached to fertile, 
especially alluvial, land, and settlement patterns becme more concentrated. There is 
much evidence of an increase in demographic pressure in fertile areas in the 1880s and 
1890s. Population movements into the fertile areas resulted in clans no longer being 
regarded as exclusive territorial or political units based on isibongv clan relations. 
Birth control was practised through sexual abstention during pout-natal lactation 
periods and by limiting births to one every third harvest. The adoption of calorie- 
rich maize and cassava indicates an adjustment to overpopulation,and the disinclination 
of the Tsonga to use ploughs suggests a high degree of population pressure on fertile 
land. Erskine remarked of Bilene in 1871: "I did not think a ECaffir country could be 
so thickly inhabited as this valley; although I have of course seen the Zulu and Swazi 
countries.I1 (74) Junod estimated that the numbers of Nondwane settled on the Nyaka 
soil areas before the 1894 wax averaged 350 per square mile. (75) This placed new 
pressures on the Tsonga social system, which were then reflected in the economy. 
The p a t  ambition of a Tsonga homestead head was to encircle the village 
kraal with huts, but the Tsonga system of political and material inheritance always 
mitigated against this. Although theoretically a joint family system, inheritance 
within the patrilineal village passed throw31 the father's brother and a strict 
hierarchical pattern of land distribution and political authority was followed. The 
shrinking of non-agricultural economic options (see later in the paper) resulted in 
standards of living become increasingly dependent on the productive value of land,and 
as land allocation was controlled by elders an increasing gap appeared between the real 
and desired standards of living of junior homestead members. Wage labour facilitated 
the segmentation from the homestead of younger members dissatisfied with their 
subordinate role. The breakdown of Tsonga patrilineal settlement patterns, much 
remarked on by social an-thropologists toda;y (76 ) ,  was noticed by Junod as early as 
1898. But segmentation meant settling on less fertile ground and heightening 
susceptibility to drought and disease. Drought and disease were intimately linked 
as the greatest loss of life during times of famine was not through starvation caused 
by lack of calories but by diseases caused by vitamin, and especially protein, 
deficiencies. Thus, while the adoption of calorie rich but protein deficient maize 
and cassava in the overpopulated fertile areas would have raised subsistence levels and 
standards of living, it would not appreciably have lowered mortality rates during 
famine periods. The role of famine as an af~ent of proletarianization needs much 
investigation as, even in times of famine, in moving to the mining compounds of South 
Africa, migrants were not moving from hi& to low mortality areas - probably just the 
reverse - and the periods spent enduring the discomforts and dangers of the mines 
should be seen as an economic investment aimed at an increased standard of Living 
rather than as an escape from famine. Wages were used to supplement local agricultural 
production and to counteract the effects of drought and disease. By 1895 it was noticed 
that the people living around Delagoa Bay "appaxently prefer buying imported food to 
growing sufficient for their own use. This is doubtless due to the high rate of wages 
obtainable in the labour markett1. 
Another result of the breakdown of the patrilineage was that Tsonga 
settlement patterns became more dependent on ecological factors and political 
patronage than on kinship links. ltIn-migration" preceded, accompanied, and probably 
facilitated qtout-migrationff. Villages moved and became segmented owing to contamination 
by death, witchcraft, soil exhaustion, floods, political disturbances, and epidemics 
of dysentery, black water fever and smallpox. Unhealthy migrant labour dep6ts provided 
breeding grounds for diseases like bubonic plague and smallpox, and migrants acted as 
hosts for disease-ca,rry-ing vectors and sporozoites. As well as spreading local 
diseases (malaria, bilbzia, tickbite fever, tr~rpansomiasis) , migravlts imported 
bronchial and venereal diseases from the compounds. The rise in witchcraft practice, 
noted by numerous sources in the 1880s and 1890s, was probably an adjustment to both 
social and political dislocation and increased mortality brought about by disease. An 
increase in debilitating and fatal diseases would have raised minimum required 
subsistence levels of nutrition and, consequently, real and desired standards of living. 
Epidemics forced "in" and "outf' migration and restricted any firm attachments to one 
area or kin group, thereby facilitating further migration. The social system was 
only partially able to adapt to these new pressures. There was a tendency for younger 
marriages to be contracted. Whereas "formerly" youths were married at 25, by the late 
1880s girls were married at 12 to 15 and boys from 14 to 15 years old. This was 
probably both an attempt to anchor young migrants to the socio-economic life of the 
homestead through lobola debts and sexual-familial needs and a means of labour 
replacement for migrating youths. Concomitantly, the recognition of labour migration 
as a rite de passage, first noticed in the early 1890s, was probably an attempt to 
secure the social acceptability of migrants and mi-t labour. 
During the 1820s and 1830s, Portuguese trade with the interior was dependent 
on Tso- middlemen. (77) Iron, copper, gold and tin were imported along two trade 
routes leading from Delagoa Bay to the eastern Transvaal. Tsonga traders travelled as 
far west as the Tswana areas of the upper Limpopo and the edges of the Kalahari desert. 
Ivory, civet and leopard skins, ostrich,marabou and crane feathers traded in the 
Transvaal were exchanged at Delagoa Bay for beads and cloth with which hoes were 
obtained in the Eastern Transvaal. Rain-making and other medicines were imported from 
the Lovedu and Karanga. Navigable rivers linked the hinterland with the coast, and trade 
goods casried in canoes passed from the Nkomati to the Limpopo for two months during the 
wet season. Alan Smith has noted the importance of Tsonga trade with the Zulu in the 
early 19th century. Much work, however, still needs to be done on changing Tsonga 
trade systems and the shifting terms of trade in the 19th century. 
Trade patterns were adjusted in the 19th century to supplement and coincide 
with forced emigration to the eastern Transvaal and, later, with the demands of the South 
African labour market. In many cases migrant Labour was integrated with more extended 
patterns of exchange. The coastal labour route to Natal was favoured because it was 
fvwell-watered . . . and provided grazing". (78) Another advantage was that the route was 
"thickly populatedvt a.nd presumably offered an outlet for Zulu agricultural and cattle 
surpluses. (79) There is evidence of a cattle trade from Swaziland and Zululand to 
Bilene. (80) In the 1870s a 300% profit was made on civet exported along the coast 
route to Natal. During the "gun boom" of 1875-1878 Maputo migrants transferred their 
investment of wage earnin@ from consumer goods bought in Natal to guns bought at 
Lourengo Marques for £2-83 and resold to the Zulu, Pedi and Swazi. (81) A £3 gun could 
be exchanged for a g10 ivory tusk in the Transvaal. (82) 
Yet, in 1898, Junod referred to Tsonga trade as "a thing of the pastft. This 
decline can be attributed largely to the collapse of the ivory trade and the 
monopolistic practices of Banyan (~indu) traders. The raison d'etre for Louren~o 
Marques had been the ivory trade, supplemented by hippo ivory and animal skins, and it 
had occasioned the growth of a "superior caste" of professional hunters, the Tsonga 
ama~isi, who were bound by various rituals and taboos. They were largely financed by 
Banyan Indian capital, and traditionally gave half their ivory haul to the chief in 
whose territory the elephant was killed or paid a hunting "licence" to the chief. 
Tsonga ivory hunters did not compete with European hunters, as they operated with 
inferiox firearms in malarial and tsetse infested areas which restricted the mobility of 
mounted European hunters. While the amapisi, through their Banyan creditors, 
supplied the less profitable Indian ivory market, the European hunters operating from 
the Transvaal sold their ivory on the more competitively priced European market. But, 
by the 1860s the ivory frontier had moved from the Olifants-Nkomati area to the 
Olifants-Limpopo, and by the 1870s the best ivory hunting was to be found north of the 
Save. The amapisi adjusted to the declining ivory trade by combining Banyan-financed 
trade with ivory hunting, and the political rulers adapted by monopolizing the ivory 
in their areas. The hunte>traders rapidly responded to the Transvaal demand for 
goods imported through Lourengo &ques by turning to porterage. Porters were supplied 
by the chiefs "for a subsidy" and supplemented their wages by working on the goldfields 
of the eastern Transvaal. Porterage fees remained high as long as the tsetse belt 
prevented the use of wagon transport, but this source of income was badly affected by 
the completion of the railway to Komati Poort in the late 1880s and by the bridging of 
the tsetse belt by the extension of the railway to the Rand and Barberton in the early 
1890s. Porte*mig3:ants came to depend more heavily on wage labour, and by the beginning 
of the 20th century even local porterage duties were performed by women. 
As the ivory trade through Lourengo Marques declined, Banyan merchants, 
hoping to benefit from the sterling imported by migrant workers, transferred their 
capital to retail trade with the interior. From 1857 to 1871 the long dormant 
Lourengo Marques customs revenues almost quadrupled and Banyan taxes provided most of 
the revenue for the struggling Portuguese administration. The Banyans, who had 
entered Lourengo Marques as independent merchants after the opening of the port to 
foreigners in 1853, totalled some 39 in 1859. By 1890 there were 250 operating in 
the town and another 500 in the interior. By 1895 this figure had risen to 1,000. (83) 
Hardy traders, they were prepared to spend 5 to 10 years in an insalubrious 
climate before returning home. The Banyans formed temporary marriage alliances by 
paying lobola in sterling and, by pa;ying trading fees to the chiefs in liquor, guns 
and cloth, exerted a political influence on the politics of the hinterland. By the 
early 1870s, trade was considered to be "in the hands of Banyans". (84) llLourengo 
Marques lives by grog and by natives in search of work, and the money they earn when 
they come back. One can get little in the stores besides goods for the native 
trade." (85) In 1887 the British consul considered that "the natural produce of the 
district is nil; its wealth consists in the savings of the natives from their earnings 
in our South African colonies ... a comparatively large trade exists ... paid for in 
hard cash; h?glish goldv1. (86) In 1892, credit supplied by Banyans in Lourenqo 
Marques to retailers in Gaza alone was valued at £100,000, and in 1893 an estimated 
£84,000 to £96,000 net cash profit was remitted to India by Banyans working in Lourengo 
Marques. Profits from the retail trade were also partly reinvested in cashew and ivory 
exports to India and in local salaries. 
By monopolizing the retail trade, the Banyans controlled the circulation of 
currency at Louren~o Marques. Portuguese bank notes were not considered legal tender 
even in government institutions and overvalued Portuguese coins were seldom used. Any 
Portuguese colonists wishing to trade with the interior, unless representing foreign 
firms, were thus dependent on Bamyan credit. Banyan knowledge of localized market 
conditions and monopolization of river transp'brt effectively excluded competition. 
# ,  
From the early 1870s, German potato spirits were imported by European 
wholesalers and distributed in the interior by Banyan retailers. There was no tax on 
imported Portuguese wine, and it needed no retailing licence to sell. There is evidence 
of wine bei& absorbed into Tsonga social rituals as a libation and as sororate fines 
and rewards. 
In 1891 & estimated 80,000 demijohns of liquor were imported and diluted 
(generally 1:2) before being retailed in the interior. (88) One of the fifteen Banyan 
liquor merchants in Khosen in 1891 handled from 3,500 to 5,000 gallons of wine per 
month. Liquor was a great proletarianizing agent, both indirectly through increased 
consumer demands and more directly by labour recruiters building their camps near to 
the canteens. Banyan canteens were dotted all along the labour routes and clustered 
around river drifts; they were recognized by labour recruiters as a vital force in 
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determining the flow and direction of Mozambican migrant labour. 
In addition to st3hmilating the demand for liquor, the Banyans also stimulated 
the demand for other imported commodities, With cattle at a premium, it seems that it 
was more profitable for the Tsonga to buy blankets costing 3s to 7s and imported cotton 
goods. Local manufacture of cotton and bark cloth was undercut by cheap imports from 
Britain and India; in 1890, 25% of the £121,000 of cotton goods imported through 
Lourengo Marques came from India. As a British official travelling' in Maputo 
succinctly put it: 
I was informed that formerly they weaved garments out of 
the wild cotton found in the thorn country ... now, 
however, they can obtain all the clothing they require by 
purchasing it wherever they go to work, and at Delagoa 
Bay,they seldom or never go to the trouble of making 
their own, which is, of course, inferior to that made by 
Europeans. (89) 
Locally produced salt, both vegetable and evaporated from tidal lagoons and 
rivers, made excessive demands on labour and was replaced by imported salt. "We saw 
some people getting salt, digging up clods of mud, which is covered at spring tides 
with salt. The salt is dissolved out of th mud and then dried out of the water. A 
sufficiently tedious process.'' (90) This in twin had a deleterious effect on local 
trade as salt was an important exchange commodity. However, this was partially offset 
by the new demand for smoking tobacco, a habit introduced by migrants returning from. 
South Africa; tobacco was formerly taken only as snuff. Its cultivation was a Tsonga 
male preserve and it was important in local exchange. 
3 -  
Migratory labour in the pre-conquest period should thus be seen as an 
adjustment to pressures stemming both from within and from without the societies of 
the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Although in many cases Tsonga society was able to adapt 
to labour losses, migratory labour induced an unhealthy dependence on imported 
consumer, capital and exchange goods. Junod recounts an anecdote: "'Without thisl, 
said [a Tsow] to me, pulling the flap of my coat, 'the whites would never have 
conquered us! In our wars with them there have alwws been some of us who would not 
give up these stuffs, and so made alliance with the Europeans. We were divided and 
thus our power of resistance was broken.'" 
The pattern of migratory labour was to change radically after 1895. 
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